Smith Brothers Lumber Company v. William E. Johnson and His Wife, Lila Johnson : Appellant\u27s Brief by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (cases filed before 1965)
1966
Smith Brothers Lumber Company v. William E.
Johnson and His Wife, Lila Johnson : Appellant's
Brief
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Daines and Thomas; Atttorneys for Defendants-Appeliants.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (cases filed before 1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Smith Brothers Lumber v. Johnson, No. 10701 (1966).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4903
I 
t 
J 
Moc'~ 1 1967 
In the Supreme Comfwr{AJUi 
of the State of Utah 
SMITH BROTHERS LUMBER \ 
COMPANY. ~ 
Plaintiff-Respondent, BRIEF OF 
APPELLANTS 
WILLIAM E. J~~NSON and his ) c:~;o~o. 
wife, LILA JOHNSON, 
Defendants-Appellants. ' 
I 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 
1st District Court for Cache 
County 
Honorable Lewis Jones, District. Judge 
Daines and Thomas ~: ~ 
Atttorneys for Defendants-Appeliants :. 
442 North Main Street 
Logan, Utah 
George C. Heinrich 
- '11'<:'!'.. 
... J,_J 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
35% North Main Street 
Logan, Utah 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Statement of the Kind of Case -------------------------------·-------- 1 
Disposition in Lower Court -------------------------------------------- 1 
Relief Sought on Appeal---------------------------------------------------- 1 
Statement of Fact ------------------------------------------------------------ 2 
Argument 
POINT 1. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF-APPELEE 
WAS AN ORIGINAL CONTRACTOR 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECTION 38: 
1 :7, U.C.A., 1953, AND AS SUCH HAD 
EIGHTY DAYS WITHIN WHICH TO 
FILE NOTICE OF INTENTION TO 
CLAIM A MECHANICS LIEN---------------- 3 
A. Section 38 :1 :3, U.C.A., 1953 (Those 
entitled to lien), creates four classes of 
possible lienors : 1. Contractors, 2. Sub-
contractors, 3. Laborers by the day or 
piece, 4. Materialmen -----------··--·-·-····----····· 3 
B. Section 38 :1 :7, U.C.A., 1953 (Notice of 
claim- -contents - recording), classifies 
lienors in accordance with Section 3, 
and allows materialmen sixty days 
from the date of the last delivered ma-
terials to file a notice of intention to 
claim a lien -------·------------------·--------·---·-·-·---- 9 
Conclu;.;ion 
Page 
C. The Plaintiff-Appellee is a "Material-
man'' and not an original contractor 
for the purpose;; of Section 7 ________________ 10 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 14 
STAr1'1 'Tgs CI11 ED 
Section 38-1-3, lTtah Code Annotated, 1953 ____________ 3, 4, 5 
Section 38-1-6, rtah Code Annotated, 1953 ____________________ 5 
Section 38-1-7, Ptah Code Annotated, 1953 ________________ 3, 9 
Section 38-1-10, rtah Code Annotated, 1953 _______________ _ 
Section 38-1-14, 1,tah Code Annotated, 1953 ____________ 5-6 
Section 38-1-19, rtah Code Annotated, 1953 ________________ 8-9 
Section 38-1-21, Ptah Code Annotated, 1953 ________________ 8-9 
Section 38-1-22, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ________________ 8-9 
Finlay v. Tagholm 62 Wash 341, 113 P 1083 (Wash) 14 
Fisher et al v. Tomlirnwn et al 40 Or 111, 60 P 390, 
66 P 696 (Oregon) -------------------------------------------------------- 13 
Forman v. St. Germain 81 Minn 26, 83 NW 438 (Minn) 14 
Forseberg v. Koss Constr. Co. 218 Iowa 818, 252 NW 
258 (Iowa) -------------------------------------------------------------------- 12 
'l'.:\HLI;~ ffW CON'l'gN'l'S (continued) 
Page 
Hinn Hammond Lumher Co. v. 1'Jlson 171 Cal 570, 154 
P 12 (Calif.) ---------------------------------------------------------------- 11 
Staples v. Adams, Payne & Gleaves (1914; CCA 4th) 
215 F 322 -------------------------------------------------------------------- 12 
Sparks v. Butte County Gravel Min. Co. 55 Cal 389 
(Calif.) -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10 
Stephens Lumber Co. v. Townsend-Stark Corp 228 
Mich 182, 199 NW 706, 201NW213 (Michigan) ____ 14 
vVilfwn v Hind 113 Cal 357, 45 P 695 (Calif.) ____________ 13 
MISCELLANEOUS 
3G American .Jurisprudence 47 (Mechanics Liem; 
8ec. :)2) .. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 11 
:36 American .Jurisprudence Cumulative Supp. (1966) 
7 (Section 52, Materialmen) -----------------------------------· 11 
141 American Law Reports Annotated 324 (b. Fur-
nishing Materials Only) -------------------------------------------- 10 
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
SMITH BROTHERS LUMBER 
COMPANY. 
Plaintiff-Respondent, I 
VS. 
Wf LLIAM E. JOHNSON and his ~ 
wife, LILA .JOHNSON, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF 
APPELLANTS 
Case No. 
10701 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by the Plaintiff-Respondent 
to enforce a Mechanics Lien against a !'mbsequent pur-
chasE>r of real property without notice. 
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court. From a judgment for 
thE> Plaintiff, Defendants appeal. 
RELIEF SOFGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek a reversal of the judgment and a 
judgment in their favor as a matter of law. 
2 
The Plaintiff, a Ftah Corporation, engaged in the 
lm:-;in<':-;:-; of marketing hnildinµ; :-;upplies, furnished builrl-
ing supplies from materials in stock to L Edward 
Skabelund, for the purpose of making certain improve-
ments on the Skabelund property in Logan. Delivery 
of the materials was made between March 5, 1963 and 
August 6, 1964, which was the last of such deliveries. 
Mr. Skabel und being a carpenter by trade did the work 
himself after hours and on holidays, and in the course 
of the construction incorporated all of the materials 
furnished him hy the Plaintiff of the value of $1,927.16, 
for which he paid tht> sum of $1,270.lL leaving $657.05 
due and owing at tlw tinw of the commencement of this 
action. 
On June 29, 1964, ~William E. Johnson, one of the 
Defendants, purchased the property on which the im-
provements had been made without actual knowledge 
of the outstanding deht. 
On October 7, 1964, the Plaintiff filed a ''Notice of 
Intention to Claim a Lien", it being 62 days after the 
last delivery of materials to the building site. 
The Plaintiff thereupon brought this action to enforce 
the supposed lien which it had filed notice of intention 
to claim. 
3 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. 1 : THE COPRT ERRED IN FINDING 
'l1HA 'l' 'l'HJ;~ PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT WAS AN 
''ORIGINAL CONTRACTOR" FOR THE PURPOSE 
OF SEC'l'ION 38-1-7, U.C.A., 1953, AND AS SUCH HAD 
J1jJGHTY DAYS WI'l'HIN WHICH TO FILE NOTICE 
OF INTENTION TO CLABf A MECHANICS LIEN. 
POINT NO. lA: SECTION 38-1-3, r.C.A, 1953, 
('l'HOSJ;J J1~NTITLED TO LIEN) CREATES FOUR 
CLASSES OF POSSIBLE LIENORS: 1. CONTRAC-
TORS. 2. srBCONTRACTORS, 3. LABORERS BY 
THE DAY OR PIECE, 4. MATERIALMEN. 
According to Section 38-1-7, U.C.A., 1953, there are 
three distinct periods limiting the time allowed dif-
ferent classes of lienors to file a notice of intention to 
claim a lien. 
1. J1~ighty days after the completion of the "Original 
<>on tract". 
2 8ixtv daw; after the last material delivered or la-. - . . 
hor done. 
~. 8ixt~· days after the original contract is completed. 
Limitation No. 3 pertains to those operating at the 
insistence of the original contractor and includes "a 
subcontractor or any person furnishes labor or mater-
ials" ... Limitation No. 1 pertains to "original con-
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tractors''. 11' the total sd1eme of classification of pos-
sible lienors contemplates only "original contractors" 
and "subcontractors'' then the limitation No. 2 is a 
ust>ll:'ss and confusing provision. 
Section :38-1-:3, FC.A., 1%3 (rl'HOSE ENTITLFJD TO 
LIFJN) defines not two hut four classes of lienors and 
says "CONTRACTORS, SUBCONTRACTORS (2) 
and all persons PFJRFOR~fING LABOR (4) upon or 
Fl~RNTSHING MATl<~RIALS (3) to he used in, the 
constructlon ... shall have a lien on the property ... '' 
Whl:'n we superirnpose on this section the three distinct 
periods of limitation for filing (as per Section 7) we 
find the 60 da~· after last delivery period a meaningful 
and sensible provision. If we, however, disregard the 
classification and sa~· that groups (3) and (4) do not 
exist separately lrnt arc• onl~· repetitive definitions of 
Contractors and Subcontractors 60 days after last de-
livery as well as the order of satisfaction (as per sec-
tion 14) and the priority of claims (as per Section 6), 
becomes not only meanin,gless and of no effect, hut also 
senseless and confusing of the whole scheme of liens 
and lien holders as described by the other sections of 
the chapter. FnleRs we want to walk blindly through the 
remainder of the sections we must affirm the existence 
of the traditional group of lien holders widely and com-
monly known as '' Materialmen'' who supply materials 
from their stocks at regular prices AND without bidding 
or any of the other normal attendant characteristics of 
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a genuine contractor's contract. 
The classes so set forth by this section is carried con-
sistently through the sections of the chapter which have 
relevence to the classes of lienors (Section 3), priority 
of claims (Section 6), order of satisfaction (Section 14), 
the equal footing:-; of materialmens and laborers liens 
(Section 10). 
Section 38-1-6, lT.C.A., 1953, clearly designates four 
elasses of people eligible for the benefits of the chapter 
of the code " ... due to an ORIGINAL CONTRACTOR 
( 1) from the owner of any property subject to lien under 
this chapter shall be valid as against any lien of a SUB-
CONTRACTOR (2) or MATERIALMAN (3) and no 
sueh attachment, garnishment or levy upon any money 
due to a SPBCONTRACTOR (2) or MATERIALMAN 
(3) from the CONTRACTOR (1) shall be valid as 
against any lien of a LABORER EMPLOYED BY THE 
DAY OR PIECE (4). 
Section 38-1-3, U.C.A., 1953 contemplates the identi-
cal scheme of classification: "CONTRACTORS (1), 
SUBCONTRACTORS (2), and all persons PERFORM-
ING LABOR (4), or FURNISHING MATERIALS (3) 
to be used in, the construction ... '' 
Section 38-1-14, P.C.A., 1953 also re-identifies the 
classes for the purpose of order in satisfaction of decree: 
''In every case in which liens are claimed against the 
same property the decree shall provide for their satis-
{j 
faction in the following order: 1. Sl'BCONTRACTORS 
who are laborers or nwehanies who are working for 
thf:' da:-· or piece.'' 
'l'l1e Idaho Code follows the same scheme but is some-
what clearer in making the distinctions. In Section 45-
5-12 Judgment to declare priority, (this is comparable 
to Section 38-1-14, P.C.A., 1%3). 
1. All laborers, other than contractors or subcon-
tractors. 
2. All 1T aterialrnen othf:'r than contractors or sub-
<'Ontractors. 
3. Subcontractors. 
4. 'l'he original Con tractor. 
Certainly all of tlwse (as in the Utah code) possible 
lienors have a relation which is contractual in nature. 
'l'he conclusion from hoth Codes is obvious, that all those 
who have contractual relations are not either Contrac-
tors or Subcontractors, there are two other groups, La-
borers (defined as those working by the day or piece 
in Utah, 42 Ida 391, 246 P 962) and 1\faterialman (one 
who furnishes materials to he used). Since all have 
contractual relations of a sort the dividing factor is 
the nature and extent of that relation, and based on that 
distinction some will he elassified as ''Contractors'' and 
some as "Materialrnen", though both are furnishing 
matt>rials and hoth have some sort of contractual re-
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la ti on. '' '11he evidence on behalf of the Gem State Lumber 
Company is sufficient to support a finding that it was 
a rnateriahnan and entitled to a lien as such. "Supra" .. 
We must then look at the contractual relation between 
tlie parties to S{'e it' they are those of a "Contractor" or 
mere I>' those of a "l\faterialman ". 
'l'l:P onl>' suhstantial difference between the TTtah 
statute and the Idaho statute is that the priorities are 
re-arranged, the classification has remained consistent. 
Fndt>r the l'tah statute the rnaterialman and the sub-
contractor are given equal priorities, while the lahorer 
ii;; ,givt>n first priority. 
Sections 14-2-1, Idaho Code, 14-2-2, Idaho Code Bond 
Stats. talk of materialmen. 
In fop st>eond paragraph of the seventh section of this 
chapter, there is a separation of those who are operating 
at the insistence of the original contractor into two 
groups, SUBCONTRACTORS, and ANY PERSON 
WHO FURNISHES LABOR OR MATERIALS AT 
TI-IF~ INSTANCE AND REQUEST OF AN ORIGINAL 
CONTRACTOR. Even on the subcontractor level (or 
on the level of those operating at the insistence of the 
original contractor) there is a distinction between those 
on contract (technical Subcontractors) and those work-
ing at the insistence of the Contractor but not on "con-
tract'' to do so (who are laborers by day or piece or ma-
terial suppliers). For the purpose of setting periods of 
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filinµ: of limitation both of these categories are grouped 
together "then such Sl-BCONTRACTORS or PER-
SON'S liE>n rights, . are extended so as to make the· 
final date for the filing of a notice of intention to hold 
and claim a lien sixty days after competion of the ori-
ginal contract of the original contractor". Had there 
hf'f'n no contemplation of separate categories for "1\la-
terialmen'' and Lahore rs h~' the day or piece'' (as op-
posed to Subcontractors) thf' articulation of this section 
would not have shown such careful protection of the 
rightr-; of this otht>r µ:ronp of furnishers or labor and 
materials. 
The definitions in Section 2 are useful in understand-
ing the intent of thf' distinction in Sections 19, 21 and 22, 
hut we contend shonl<l not he allowed to destroy the 
meaning and intE>rnal eonsistE>ncy of the remaining and 
most important sections of the chapter (and those which 
are uniquely in point in this litigation). 
Much of the diffi<'ulty in interprE>ting what the defini-
tons in Section 2 mean and were meant to effect might 
hinge around what was meant by the words "by con-
tract". If the legislaturP mE>ant a traditional building 
or corn;;truction contra<'t with a customer discrete job 
to be done at a eertain total pricf' and not jmit any obli-
gation which might expressly or impliedly arise from 
an off the shelf dispem;ing of individual items for use 
in construction, thE>n Contractor as defined in Section 2 
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would be consistent not only with Sections 19, 21 and 22, 
but 'vith the 'vhole chapter, in that it would allow for 
the existence of MA 'f}~RlALMEN and LABORERS BY 
1'HE DAY OR Pll'X~J<~. And if the wording "all other 
persons doing work or furnishing materials shall be 
deemed subcontractors'', was intended to mean all other 
persons doing work or furnishing materials by contract 
express or implied ''at the insistence of an orif,!;inal con-
tractor, shall he deemed Subcontractors, then Subcon-
tractors, for the same reasons as stated above would 
be a useful category, consistent with not just a part hut 
all of the chapter. 
POINT NO. lB: SECTION 38-1-7, U.C.A., 1953 (NO-
TICE OF CLAIM - CONTENTS RECORDING), 
CLASSIFIES LIENORS IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
SF,CTION 3, AND ALLOWS MATERIALMEN SIXTY 
DAYS FROl\I THE DATE OF THE LAST DELIVERY 
OF MATE~RIALS TO FILE A NOTICE OF TNTEN-
TTON TO CLAIM A LIEN. 
The wording· of Section 7 illustrates its consistency 
with the classification scheme of Sections 3, 6, 10 and 14. 
PERIOD 
1. 80 days after the 
completion of the or-
iginal contract 
CLASS TO WHICH IT IS 
APPLICABLE 
Original Contractors (those 
eontractors who are operat-
ing under a specific contract 
directlv with the owner.) 
2. GO days after last 
material delivered or 
labor done 
::. 00 days after the 
contract by the ori-
ginal contractor has 
hPPn completed 
JO 
)IA'fERlALMEN AND 
LABORERS (Lahorers who 
work by the day or piece, 
and materialmen who fur-
nish goods directly to the 
owner hut are not on ''con-
tractors'' analagous t o 
working by the day or pit>ef• 
by laborers.) 
SUBC 0 N T RA C T 0 R S 
(those who labor or mater-
ials or both at the insisten<'<' 
of the original contractor 
or are on a specific contrnf't 
to do so.) 
POINT NO. l C: 1'HJ1~ PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT' 
IS A "MATERIALMAN" AND NOT AN ORIGINAL 
CON1'RAC1'0R F'OR THF, PPRPOSES OF SECTION 
SKVEN. 
One furnishing, under a contract with the owner, ma-
terials to be used in the construction of a building is 
a materialman and not an original contractor within 
the provision of the mechanics lien law relating to the 
time for filing a lien. SP ARKS v. BF1'1'F, COUNTY 
GRAVEL MIN. CO. (1880) 55 Cal 389: Heacock Sash 
and Door Co. v. w PathPrf ord ( 1931 ) rn5 or 153. 294 p 
344. 
141 ALR 324 b. FrRNTSHING i\fA1'ERTALS ONLY 
''Generally, one who merely furnishes materials to 
the OWNER or a contractor is a matPrialman, and not 
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a contractor or a subcontractor, within the meaning of 
mechanic's lien laws.'' 
Am J ur 36 l\f echanics Liens Section 52 MATERIAL-
M:EN 
The right to assert a mechanics lien is now generally 
extended to materialmen or THOSE PEOPLE WHO 
SUPPLY MATERIALS FOR THE STRUCTURE AND 
HAVE NO OTHER CONNECTION WITH THE 
WORK. 
36 Am .Tur (1966) supplement page 7 to supplement 
note 20 page 47 "Nor is one who merely furnishes ma-
terial a ''contractor'' within the meaning of mechanics 
lien laws. 
36 Am Jur Section 165 WHO IS A "CONTRACTOR" 
A "Contractor" within the provisions of a mechanics 
lien statute with limit liens of subcontractors, laborers 
or materialmen for material or labor furnished to the 
contractor to the amount earned but unpaid on the con-
tract, or which give such liens by subrogation, IS ONE 
WHO WOULD BE CHARACTERIZED AS A CON-
TRACTOR IN THE COMMON SPEECH OF MEN. 
AND WE THINK NOT JUST A BUILDING SUP-
PLIES CUSTOMER. 
RINN HAMMOND LUMBER CO. v ELSON 171 
Cal 570 154 P 12 
That literally, a subcontractor is one who agrees with 
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another to perform a part or all of the obligation whi<'h 
the second party owes by contract to a third party, hut 
that the word has much narrower meaning in mechanics 
lien law which divides the liens into four classes. to-wit, 
laborers, 111aterialmen, subcontractors and original con-
tractors, that the term subcontractor as so used must he 
determined by referen<'e to this classification and to the 
i,rnbjeet to which it relates, and embraces all persons who 
agree with the original contractor to furnish the material 
and construct for him on the premises some part of the 
structure which the ori,ginal contractor had agreed to 
erect for the owner, and that persons who merely furn-
ish materials to the ('ontractors to be used and which 
are used, in the eon:-:truction of the huilding- come within 
the second elass - as rnaterialmen. 
FORSEBERO v. KOSR CON8'l'R. CO. (1934) 218 
IOWA 818, 252 N·w 258 
One who delivered :-:and was not a subcontractor hut 
a materialman. 
STAPLES v ADA~1~. PAYNF, AND GLEAVES 
( 1914) CCA 4th) 215 F' :122, in ref ere nee to one who 
furnished materials to a building contractor it was 
stated that whether· he was a subcontractor was doubt-
ful, that there was no attempt to prove the existence of 
a <'ontract entered into an~, time, or for any definite 
ciuantity of materials, that nothing more was shown than 
an ordinary running account between a dealer and his 
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customer, that the building contractor, each of whose 
purchases was a separate transaction, was free, at any 
time, to purchase elsewhere, and that is as the Court 
supposed, there was a clear distinction between a sub-
contractor and a materialman, it was unable to see that 
the furnisher of the materials was anything more than 
a materialman. "Holding that one who furnished ma-
terials to a building contractor on a running account 
did not serve in time the required notice to the owner 
under a statute making the latter personally liable to 
a subcontractor to the extent of the amount due from 
the owner to the original contractor, the Court said 
that he was nothing more than a materialman. 
WILSON ET AL v. HIND ET AL (1896) 113 Cal 
357' 45 p 685. 
1. A person contracting to furnish material for a 
building, such as doors, sashes, blinds, etc., which, in-
stead of manufacturing to order, he purchased ready 
made is a materialman only.'' 
FISHER ET AL V. TOMLINSON ET AL 1901 40 
Or 111, 60 P 390, 66 P 696 at 697 ... His letters to Plain. 
tiffs to the effect that he had secured the contract to 
furnish all the shop work, sash, doors, glass, etc., do not 
intimate that he was to place in the building, as a part 
thereof any of the material ordered. He was therefore 
as the evidence clearly shows, only a materialman . . . 
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F'INl.u\Y \'. 'l'AOHOL!\I 1911 G2-Wash 341.113 P 
1 os;~. 1084. 
''The third point urged, that the appellant is a suh-
<'ontractor, is without merit. If one who furnishes the 
:-;a:-;J1es, door:-;, and g-lass for a huilding iR a suhcontrartor, 
<>vPry mat<->riahnan would fall in that class, and such 
<'Onstruction would nullif~· the plain terms of the statute. 
STE PH Ij~NS Lr.\I BER CO Y. TOWNSEND-STARK 
CORP. (1924) 228 :\lirh 182, 1999 NW 706, 201 NW 213. 
A lumber eompan~· doing· no "'ork on the premises. but 
onl~· furnishing lumher and door frames and window 
frames and othPr thing-:-; whirh it carried in stock and 
did not have to rnannfartnre arcording to the building 
rontractor':-; sperifi<·ations, is a materialman, and not 
a contractor, and tl1NPforP, <>ntitlf'd to a lien without 
filing the affidavit reqnirf'd of <'ontractors. 
FORMAN Y. ST. <H~Rl\IATN (1900) 81 Minn 26, 83 
N'V 438. Owner orderf'd gfaRs df'livered and installed hy 
the furnislwr was not a <'ontrartor hut a materialman. 
Thf'rf' has lwf'n no assPrtion that the Plaintiff made 
any improvements on tla1 111atf'rialfl to makf' them more 
suitable for the partirular joh in whi<'h th(ly were to be 
used, or that he aided in their inHtallation in the building. 
In fact then• is nothing to indicate that the relation of 
the Plaintiff and the Defendants was any morf' than a 
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customer or purchaser and seller. The agreement entered 
into by the parties was the kind that any casual custo-
mer implies or expresses, and the Defendant was not 
hound by it to continue buying from the Plaintiff, he 
could have at any point ceased his purchases and become 
the customer of any of a variety of other firms. The 
Plaintiff is at most a supplier of materials and as such 
did not meet the time requirements exacted of his class 
of lienors for filing a notice of intention to claim a lien. 
For these reasons and those stated in the body of the 
argument we pray the Court for a reversal of the judg-
ment entered below. 
Respectfully submitted 
DAINES & THOMAS 
Attorneys for Appellants 
